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ABSTRACT. Unsustainable land uses present many challenges for securing ecosystem service provision. It is also difficult to estimate
the cost of a transition to more sustainable land-management practices for individual landholders. The main cost to landholders is the
opportunity costs, the income foregone when changing land use for continued or enhanced ecosystem service provision. Thus accurate
estimation of opportunity costs and understanding their distribution are crucial starting points for determining the economic viability
and design of any payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme. We compare two opportunity cost approaches and examine the
distribution of these costs for improving drinking water quality in a complex farming system in a Honduran forest catchment. Data
for both approaches was collected through a survey applied to upstream catchment landholders. Our results indicate that the direct
flow approach and the proxy rent approach provide comparable and consistent opportunity cost estimates. The mean net flow return
ha-1 was US$1410, but this estimate was skewed, mainly by exceptionally high coffee returns and negative returns of land uses making
a loss. This estimate would imply spending over US$2 million per annum for water conservation, but a revised estimate comes to
US$257,057 per annum. Opportunity costs were found to vary according to differences in land use and landholder characteristics. High
value cash crops upholding the local economy, such as coffee, entail much higher opportunity costs than for example cattle grazing.
These results suggest that discriminate PES payments, that vary according to opportunity costs and thus discriminate between land
uses and landholders, are essential. Water quality at our case study site could be managed sustainably by a scheme focusing on high-
impact land uses with lower opportunity costs and closer to water sources.
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INTRODUCTION
Unsustainable land-use practices pose many challenges for
managing land for ecosystem service provision (Wünscher et al.
2011). In particular, securing safe drinking water is a major issue
in developing countries because of a complex array of threats on
both the demand and supply side (Rangel Soares et al. 2002,
Jouravlev 2004, Trevett et al. 2004, UNICEF and WHO, 2012).
In rural areas, water pollution typically originates from
unsustainable land uses, poor sanitation, and other factors,
involving numerous and dispersed land users (Olmstead 2010,
Smith and Porter 2010, Smith et al. 2012). Thus, it is often
necessary to restrict or change current land use to secure the
provision of water for beneficiaries. There is also a need for
efficient governance structures and incentive mechanisms to
transition to more sustainable land-management practices.  
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes are one way to
finance and incentivize improved water provision in developing
countries. These schemes transfer financial resources from
beneficiaries to those providing the service to cover the costs of
provision. There are several debated issues surrounding PES
scheme design and implementation that need further research.
One of them is how to accurately estimate the costs of provision
with the best approach (Wunder 2005, Wünscher et al. 2008).
Second, deciding what the aim(s) of the scheme will be, by either
targeting environmental benefits, the reduction of the risk of
ecosystem services loss, or simply landholders’ costs of
participation, including opportunity costs (Wunder 2005,
Asquith et al. 2008, Bruijnzeel and Noordwijk 2008, Plumb et al.
2012). A third debated issue is how to determine who gets paid
what in PES schemes (Wunder 2005, Wünscher et al. 2008). Both
uniform payments (all participants paid the same) and
discriminating payments (participants paid differently according
to provision or another factor) have been used (Claassen et al.
2008, Pagiola 2008, Chen et al. 2010). Targeting approaches can
render PES schemes a poverty alleviation tool or a means to make
the well-to-do better off  (Pagiola and Platais 2002, Rosa et al.
2003, Pagiola et al. 2005).  
It is difficult to determine precise and fair compensation to service
providers because of heterogeneous land costs, multiple
stakeholders, methodological limitations, and inequitable
distribution of project outcomes (Corbera et al. 2007a, Adams et
al. 2010, Dong et al. 2011, Bryan 2013, FFI 2014). The main costs
borne by landholders are opportunity costs; the income foregone
by a landholder when changing land use to provide continued or
enhanced ecosystem services (e.g., Sinden 2004, Naidoo and
Adamowicz 2006). Opportunity costs are based on scarcity and
exclusiveness because one course of action prevents another one
from happening (Sinden, 2004, Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006,
Pirard 2008). Estimating opportunity costs accurately and
understanding their distribution based on land and landholder
attributes is a crucial starting point to determine the economic
viability and design of PES schemes (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009,
Plumb et al. 2012).  
The opportunity cost literature uses approaches like net returns
from land uses, proxies obtained from land attributes, and land
prices for estimating opportunity costs, and more recently
screening contracts and procurement auctions have also been used
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(e.g., Borrego and Skutsch 2014, Chomitz et al. 2005, Jack et al.
2009, Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006, Wünscher et al. 2011). These
methods have been used to calculate the cost of conservation, to
assess trade-offs in land allocation, and to design PES schemes
(Pagiola and Bosquet 2009). However, all these methods have
weaknesses. Screening contracts require detailed knowledge
about the distribution of landowner types and sophisticated
calculations by conservation practitioners (Wünscher et al. 2011).
Procurement auctions are complex to design and require a large
pool of bidders (Ferraro 2008, Tóth et al. 2010). The accuracy of
land attribute information will only be as good as the strength of
the correlations between the attributes and landholder types
(Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006). Land-use net returns, or the flow
approach, has many assumptions, requires costly and time-
consuming data collection, must account for short-term
variability of returns, and needs in depth knowledge of the local
context (Plumb et al. 2012). The rent approach in turn requires
existing and well-operating land markets (Cattaneo 2002, Ferraro
2004, Grieg-Gran 2008).  
Considerable challenges exist for understanding the relationships
between different opportunity cost methods and for identifying
a reliable, accurate, and cost-effective method to determine the
opportunity costs of conservation (Wünscher et al. 2011). Some
studies have used two or more approaches to obtain more robust
opportunity cost estimates. For example, Corbera et al. (2007b)
estimated opportunity costs through net farm returns, valuation
of the providers’ willingness to accept (WTA) a price for PES,
and the expected land rent in three Central American countries.
They found that different methods and assumptions yield
considerably different opportunity cost estimates. Wünscher
(2008) compared the use of hypothetical annual land rents,
modeled regressions, and farm net returns to determine
opportunity costs in Costa Rica. They recommend annual land
rents and modeled regressions approaches for practical
application in conservation programs. However, they also
identified a need for further research into opportunity cost
estimation, particularly into the flow approach used to determine
farm net returns because it did not always perform well.  
Traditional approaches to opportunity cost estimation also tend
to assume that opportunity costs can be estimated from proxies,
such as land attributes (Hunt 2010, Fisher et al. 2011a, b) and
land market prices (Chomitz et al. 2005). This is usually an
oversimplification because opportunity costs are likely to vary
spatially (e.g., with land use, accessibility, distance to water, plot
size, altitude) and according to socio-demographics of
landholders (e.g., age, gender, schooling, household size). In
particular, household attributes of landholders have only rarely
been included in opportunity costs estimation, and we need to
understand their effect on PES scheme participation and
effectiveness (for exceptions see Naidoo et al. 2006, Siikamaki
and Layton 2007). Quantifying the impact of landholder and land
attributes is an essential first step in developing a cost effective
PES scheme, especially in areas without robust land markets
because opportunity costs in provider groups, and the ecosystem
services provided, are often heterogeneous (Tallis and Polasky
2009, Adams et al. 2010, Badola et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2010).  
This research aims to apply and compare two different
opportunity cost approaches, adding support to their usage. It
also aims to understand the extent to which landholder and land
attributes explain opportunity cost heterogeneity. We do this by
estimating the opportunity costs of water provision in a
Honduran forest catchment in which multiple land uses coexist
and land markets are ambiguous. We use the flow approach, the
most widely used direct method that does not always generate
consistent results so needs further research; and the rent
approach, a proxy method, which is the most cost-effective
approach but which is said to require a well-operating land
market. We demonstrate below that the rent and flow approaches
to estimating opportunity costs provide broadly comparable
results, which are useful for designing water conservation
initiatives, including PES schemes.
METHODOLOGY
Study site
This research was conducted in the west of Honduras (area
112,492 km²), a country in Central America with a population of
over 8 million. More than half  of the people live in rural areas
and two thirds live below the poverty line (FAO 2010, INE 2014).
Honduras has abundant water resources but uses less than 10%
of its hydrological potential (GWP-Centroamerica 2011). Thus,
water availability is not an issue, but accessibility and quality are.
There is a long tradition of centralized command-and-control
style conservation based on protected areas. However, limited
political will and capacity to implement conservation policy
means that most protected areas are “paper parks” (Martin and
Blackburn 2009, Agulla Menoni 2012). Honduras’ economy is
highly dependent on natural resources, agriculture, and forestry
(Jansen et al. 2006, Gareau 2007, Larson et al. 2007). This means
that there is a substantial challenge in managing land for both
conservation and livelihoods. Local livelihoods, which are often
carried out unsustainably, and conservation objectives are thus
often in conflict (Rivera et al. 2013, Ericksen et al. 2002,
Southworth et al. 2004).  
The Güisayote Biological Reserve (Fig. 1) was created in 1987 as
one of 37 rainforest areas that provide key hydrological services,
i.e., water for domestic and industrial use (ICF 1987). A biological
reserve is one of the strictest protected area management
categories:  
an untouchable area that contains ecosystems, aspects
or flora and fauna of scientific value. Its main function
is to protect, conserve and maintain unaltered
phenomena or natural processes, for studies and
scientific research 
(SRNA 1997).  
This means that all agricultural and extractive activities are
prohibited in the core zone and restricted in the buffer zone. The
reserve has been managed by the NGO Asociación Ecológica San
Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO) since 2003. The reserve is
located between 1140 and 2310 m above sea level, with an average
temperature between 18-22 °C. Annual precipitation is high
(1150-1300 mm) with a rainy season from May to October and a
dry season from November to April. The highest parts of the
reserve have rain throughout the year with a relative humidity of
82 to 93% and an abundance of both permanent and temporal
streams (AESMO 2010).
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Fig. 1. Güisayote Biological Reserve showing the study site
(solid black outline), rivers, water sources, and roads in the
reserve. Inset shows location of the reserve in Honduras.
Our research site encompasses 4793 ha, with an upstream
catchment area of 2086.7 ha (including 243.6 ha owned by
AESMO, the municipality, and a community) of rugged
topography with very steep slopes in the watershed formed by the
Idolo, El Potrero, and El Chupadero rivers in the reserve (Fig. 1).
The site includes the core and buffer zone of the reserve, and
unprotected land. The watershed provides drinking water to 15
communities with an estimated population of 7725
(ESNACIFOR and USAID, 2002). The watershed is threatened
by varied and complex problems, such as high levels of
deforestation with only 30-68% of the reserve having forest cover
(ESNACIFOR and USAID 2002), forest degradation, and
agriculture activities for subsistence and commerce carried out by
upstream landholders (with associated open-air defecation).
Likewise, local inhabitants make (illicit) use of public and private
forests for poles, medicine, firewood, shade, and cattle grazing
(AESMO 2010). These activities all contribute to the
contamination of water sources, by excessive nutrients,
agrochemicals, bacteria, and fecal coliforms (Regional Public
Health Officer, 25 February 2011, unpublished data). Asociacion
Ecologica San Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO) and the German
corporation GIZ are currently studying the possibility of
developing a water PES scheme at this site.  
Our research considers a land set-aside payment for ecosystem
services (PES) scheme for water quality provision. Land set-aside
involves landholders halting all land use for a contracted period,
including monitoring unused land, allowing natural
regeneration, and receiving a payment in return. It is important
to note that aiming to increase water quality and quantity, more
so the latter, through the expansion of forest cover is highly
debated and often dependent on site-specific factors, such as
forest cover, rainfall patterns, and erosion (Bruijnzeel 2004,
Aylward 2005, Scott et al. 2005, Kosoy et al. 2007). Although
land set-aside is not the only PES option, it is being considered
by AESMO, therefore we examined it as a way to manage a
biological reserve subject to strict conservation regulations and
to ensure water provision in the context of multiple nonpoint
pollution sources, including hard-to-control open-air defecation
that accompanies productive land uses. Experience with past and
current conservation efforts, such as patrolling, fencing, and
legislation indicate that it is next to impossible to secure provision
of clean water with anything less than land set-aside. It could
also be effective not only for improving water quality, but also
for other ecosystem services, such as flow regulation and habitat
preservation (Postel and Thompson 2005).
Landholder and land characteristics
Upstream private landholders (i.e., landowners and renters) have
dispersed plots, with (self-reported) secure land tenure used
mainly for coffee, vegetables, and cattle ranching. Coffee is
mainly grown at lower heights for national and international
markets, and it is cultivated with few agrochemicals and without
irrigation. Vegetables (e.g., potato, cabbage, and carrot) are
grown at higher altitudes for national markets with ample use of
agrochemicals and summer irrigation. Cattle ranching takes
place across the research site for subsistence and local markets
(milk and cheese, seldom for meat). Some maize and beans are
also grown for subsistence. Coffee and vegetable growing are the
most profitable land uses but they are also affected by volatile
market prices (e.g., Charveriat 2001, Mohan 2007), which
influence opportunity cost estimates. Coffee growers belong to
one of several producer associations and cooperatives.
Opportunity cost estimation
Data were collected between 21 February and 29 October 2011.
Several initial visits to the watershed and informal interviews
with farmers helped to map land ownership because no registry
for cultivated land existed. A total of 95 upstream landholders
were identified in the catchment and attempts were made to
contact all of them to take part in the research. Landholder trust
was gained by living and working in the area for other aspects
of the research for five months before the survey took place.
During this time, focus groups were conducted with farmers,
municipality meetings where farmers were present were
attended, and formal and informal conversations were had with
farmers. The time also involved numerous visits accompanied
by staff  of the local NGO and mapping of farms and land use
with farmers themselves.  
The use of two opportunity cost methods formed a triangulation
process because four values were obtained: opportunity costs
and three land values. Landholders were interviewed starting
with those next to the community water sources (i.e., mountain
springs with infrastructure providing water to each community)
and then working outward. Two thirds (62/95) of landholders
completed the survey for the flow approach and 39 completed
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the would rent values, 74 the would sell values, and 56 the actual
land-purchase values, based on (un-) willingness to provide land
values. Only 10 landholders refused to participate and the
remaining 23 landholders could not be contacted after 3 attempts.
The majority of landholders (84%) were residents in the water-
using communities, making them beneficiaries of the service as
well as providers (referred to as dual landholders throughout the
rest of the paper).  
Our survey was designed to estimate the cost of taking land out
of production through the flow and rent opportunity costs
approaches and is available in Spanish from the lead author upon
request. The survey was administered face-to-face with the
landowner or the tenant, whoever carried out the farming
activities. Questions about landholder and land characteristics,
land values, inputs (e.g., fertilizer, vaccine) and outputs (e.g., crop
yield) of all productive land uses in 2010-2011 were asked. Labor
wages were found to be quite homogeneous across the research
site. Respondents were also asked to draw maps of their plots and
highlight their main features, such as land-use patterns, neighbors,
roads, watercourses, and infrastructure. No reference was made
in the survey to the legality of forest resource use to avoid
influencing responses; though some respondents may have been
aware of the legal implications of extracting forest resources in a
reserve. Whenever self-consumption yields were reported, they
were ascribed a market value stated by the respondent or the
average for all landholders. All values were obtained in Honduran
Lempiras for the local unit of land area manzana (equal to 0.7
ha), and converted to US dollars ha-1 at an exchange rate of US$ 1
to Lps. 18.8951 (2011 values).
Flow opportunity cost approach
The flow approach estimates net returns from land use at the local
level. The opportunity costs were estimated per landholder and
per hectare for one year by subtracting total costs from total
revenue for each land use, multiplied by the area used, to obtain
net return ha-1. Following Fisher et al. (2011b) the total
opportunity costs were obtained as follows: 
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where V is the net agricultural returns of the average hectare in
US$, summed across all land uses; Ai is the plot size in hectares
with land use i; yi is the yield of land use i; Pi is the price of land
use i in US$ per yield unit; and Cx is the cost of inputs including
labor, tools, and agricultural materials.  
Several assumptions were made to estimate the opportunity costs
using the flow approach. First, personal and family labor was
valued at 50% of the local laborers’ (“jornal”) wage. This was
considered justifiable because there are few off-farm income
earning opportunities within reasonable distance for the
landholders (for further discussion on the value of family labor
see Wünscher 2008, Wünscher et al. 2011). Second, negative net
returns from lost crops were included in the initial analysis to
obtain insight into local heterogeneity of opportunity costs.
However, agricultural returns vary from year to year. Thus, in the
final analysis, positive values and positive values excluding coffee
were estimated. Because historical opportunity costs were
unavailable, these positive estimates were assumed to represent
the appropriate long-term balanced value required for further
analyses. The negative values from low prices in cattle and crop
markets and the extremely high positive values from coffee being
at its highest for a decade were removed, to make the flow
opportunity costs comparable to the more stable land rent values.  
The determinants of opportunity costs were analyzed at
landholder and plot levels. The variables that were tested for
landholder and plot opportunity costs were based on the literature
and data availability (e.g., Grieg-Gran 2008, Wünscher et al. 2011,
Curran et al. 2016; Table 1). Continuous variables were tested
through Spearman’s ρ correlations and categorical variables
through Mann-Whitney U tests. The probability of presence of
each productive land use was then tested using binary logistic
regressions. The tested independent variables include elevation,
time to main road, access to land throughout the year, slope, and
time to water.
Table 1. Independent variables that were tested for association
with two levels of opportunity costs, per landholder and per land
plot, and their expected sign.
 
Landholder variables Expected
sign
Land variables Expected
sign
Age in years + Plot size +
Years of education + Time to road -
Family size + Time to water -
Female ? Time to house -
Proportion of
household income
coming from farmer
+ Altitude ?
Only agriculture income + Accessibility +
Number of plots used + Number of plots
used
+
Land owned + Years owned -
Number of land uses + Presence of forest +
Presence of coffee + Presence of coffee -
Presence of cattle - Presence of cattle +
Presence of crops + Presence of crops +
Rent opportunity cost approach
To estimate rent opportunity costs, respondents were asked to
state three different economic land values: “would rent” value,
“would sell” value, and “purchase price.” These three values were
elicited as the best option for the study site because the local land
market is informal and no records exist for land transactions. It
was assumed that the annual “would rent” price of a plot of
agricultural land is equal to its annual net revenue flow, whereas
the “would sell” and “purchase price” of a plot of land are equal
to the discounted flow of net revenue that the parcel is expected
to generate into the future (Weersink et al. 1999, Cavailhes and
Wavresky 2003, Goodwin et al. 2003). “Would rent” and
“purchase prices” were divided by plot size to obtain per hectare
rent value. The land “purchase prices” included transactions
carried out between 1961 and 2011, so they were adjusted for
inflation by multiplying by the consumer price index (CPI) of the
year of purchase and divided by the 2011 CPI (obtained from the
Central Bank of Honduras). Thus, the formula to determine 2011
“purchase values” was: 
 
 
 
 = [] − 


 
 
(1) 
 
	ℎ		2011	2011
= ℎ	  ∗ 	"#	$%	&'#()** + 
 
(2) 
 
  
Ecology and Society 21(4): 36
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art36/
“Purchase values” and the “would sell” prices were multiplied by
5.25%, the average general interest rate for 2011 in Honduras
(BCH 2011), to obtain land-market value, as a capitalization rate
is not available for Honduras. Land-market value is the land-
rental value, minus land taxes, divided by a capitalization rate.
The capitalization rate is a market determined rate of return that
would attract individuals to invest in the use of land, considering
all of the risks and benefits that could be realized (Gwartney
1999). Tax reporting was highly inconsistent by respondents, so
it was excluded from these estimations. The use of one off  interest
rate for all plots affects absolute but not relative estimated land
values, so does not affect our findings. We acknowledge that there
are many other factors, besides productivity, which can influence
how much landowners are willing to rent or sell their land for,
including changes in markets, economic or environmental policy,
and human preferences or culture (Naidoo and Adamowicz
2006).
The flow and rent approaches
The flow approach is a direct opportunity cost estimation that
provides detailed insight into local heterogeneity, market
dynamics, and the influence of individual land-user groups. The
rent approach is a proxy estimation of opportunity costs that
provides a less detailed, but more stable and longer-term view
excluding the effect of extreme and variable market dynamics.
Specifically, for the rent approach: the “would rent” values are
the equivalent of a stated willingness-to-accept (WTA) for setting-
aside land without losing ownership or potential nonuse benefits.
The “would sell” values are the price of forfeiting all future
streams of income and nonmarket benefits from the land. The
“actual purchase price” values are actual market values (although
land degradation and other factors may have reduced its value
since purchase). The two approaches were compared to assess the
trade-offs between them and their effectiveness at estimating
accurate opportunity costs. For the flow estimates to be
comparable to the rent estimates, the negative and extreme values
of the former, indicative of variable market dynamics, were
removed. The use of both approaches adds robustness to
estimates and consequently to the claims based on those estimates.
Opportunity cost heterogeneity
To understand the factors that determined high and low
opportunity costs, net returns were assessed using the flow
approach per landholder and land use. A two-tailed Spearman’s
rho was used to correlate landholder net returns ha-1 with the
number of plots used and the number of land uses. Mann Whitney
U Tests were used to compare the landholder opportunity costs
to gender and the presence of each land use (i.e., categorical
independent variables). Finally, binary logistic regressions were
carried out to assess the impact of five variables on the likelihood
that respondents would report growing coffee, crops, and cattle.
RESULTS
Landholder and land characteristics
Respondents were mostly male (89%; n = 62) with a mean age of
56 (SD = 12.76). They had a mean of four years of schooling (SD
= 4.93) and five family members (SD = 2.74). Farmers carried
out a mean of 1.5 productive activities (SD = 0.95), with some
being specialists (coffee growing and cattle ranching are taught
from father to son from an early age) and others being constrained
by land characteristics or lack of agronomic training. The
household income came from few sources (2.53, SD = 1.71) and
generally the landholder was the main income earner (75%, SD
= 34.21). Landholders owned one plot on average (SD = 0.58)
and plots had been owned for many years (18, SD = 11.32; see
Appendix 1).  
The amount of land owned by respondents varied widely (mean
= 15 ha, range 0.7-126 ha; Table 2). Plot size had a similar range,
0.18 ha to 126 ha, to total land owned, but a mean of 9 ha. Forest
was the most common land cover and landholders reported a
mean forest age of 32 years. Cattle ranching was the most common
productive land use followed by coffee and crops. A small land
area (15%) was also dedicated to renting, loaning, and fallow.
Table 2. Land and land use distribution among opportunity cost
survey respondents (n = 62).
 
Variable Total ha (%†) Mean
ha
SE SD Range %
Farmers
Land/
farmer
-- 14.7 3.01 23.72 0.7-126 --
Plot size -- 9.1 2.37 18.63 0.18-126 --
Forest 357.28 (39) 5.6 1.82 14.34 0-64.75 42.7
Cattle 319.2‡ (35) 4.9 1.38 10.86 0-70 38.5
Coffee 69.44 (8) 1.4 0.22 1.73 0-5.6 29.4
Rented 54.6 (6) 0.7 0.85 6.67 0-52.5 2.1
Loaned 41.86 (5) 0.7 0.33 2.6 0-18.2 13.3
Fallow 39.7 (4) 0.7 0.21 1.62 0-8.58 18.9
Crops§| 32.2 (3) 0.7 0.12 0.92 0-4.2 25.2
†Refers to net land use;
‡This area only includes land used for cattle ranching within the study
site. Total area of land for cattle ranching includes land borrowed or
rented outside the study site, which amounted to 595.88 ha;
§includes vegetables, maize, beans, improved grass, and sugar cane;
|Approximately 15 ha of vegetable land was used more than once in the
year, and 5 ha of maize and beans were used more than once or
overlapped with coffee.
 
Opportunity cost estimation
Flow opportunity cost
The mean net return ha-1 was US$1410 and the median was US$19
ha-1 (Table 3). These estimates were skewed by: (1) the high coffee
returns due to an exceptionally good market price, (2) the negative
returns of land uses making a loss, and (3) the unused forests.
Although the negative values reflected real market dynamics, they
introduced high variance into the data. Hence, two variations of
the flow approach were estimated, “flow positive,” which only
includes positive values, and “flow positive-no coffee,” which
excludes coffee values. The flow and flow positive means of
opportunity costs would imply spending over US$2 million for
water conservation annually. However, the flow and flow positive
estimates are influenced by outlying opportunity costs and are
unlikely to represent long-term costs. The flow positive-no coffee
provided a substantially smaller, but more realistic estimate of
the cost of water conservation at the study site of US$257,057
per annum.
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Table 3. Net returns US$ ha-1 with the flow and rent approaches.
Flow estimates are per land use and include forest zeros; all rent
values included once, no matter how many land uses per plot;
mean, median, minimum, and maximum rounded to zero
decimals to enhance clarity.
 
Values N Mean Median SE SD Range
Flow 186 1410 19 402.86 5494.21 -21,757-24,086
Flow positive 139 2666 263 459.08 5412.46 0-24,086
Flow positive-
no coffee
113 1839 140 409.04 4348.16 0-24,086
Would rent 39 245 151 38.72 241.83 4-1134
Would sell 74 546 397 58.82 506.02 15-2977
Actual
purchase price
56 425 160 92.97 695.74 1-2977
Figure 2 shows the spread of net returns ha-1 for each productive
land use using the flow approach. Cattle ranching and forest show
the least spread of data and central values because of low reported
forest use, and cattle farmers reporting a bad year. Only 10 out
of 52 forest plots were reported to be used in the study year. Coffee
and vegetables show the widest spread of data and highest values
because of the good year for both crops. However, both cattle and
crops reported several negative values owing to low market prices.
Furthermore, the median net return of coffee is two orders of
magnitude greater than the next highest median, crops (US$261).
That is, coffee provides the highest returns and dominates the
opportunity costs of water conservation.
Fig. 2. Net returns in US$ ha-1 for each productive land use for
2010-2011. The dotted line represents zero; circles = values
beyond the extents of the second quartile; stars = extreme
values beyond the first and third quartiles; bold lines = median;
forest N = 52, mean = US$35, median = 0; cattle N = 48, mean
= US$282, median = US$44; crops N = 58, mean = US$1501,
median = US$261;, and coffee N = 28, mean = US$5710 and
median = US$2248.
Rent opportunity cost
The 3 rent values were estimated on 39 “would rent” values, 74
“would sell” values and 56 actual land purchase values based on
respondents (un)willingness to provide a value. The total mean
“would rent” value ha-1 is US$245, “would sell” is US$546, and
actual purchase price is US$425 (Table 3). These values provide
totals for the cost of water conservation of US$278,308 for
“would rent,” US$731,711 for “would sell,” and US$294,896 for
purchase price.
The flow and rent approaches
The mean ha-1 value differs widely between the flow and rent
estimates but these estimates are correlated (Table 4). Specifically,
“flow positive” and “flow positive-no coffee” returns are
correlated to the rent values, but the raw flow returns (i.e., those
including negative returns and returns from coffee) are not.
Although coefficients are low, the high levels of confidence
(95-99%) indicate a consistent response by landholders across the
three rent values. The “flow positive-no coffee” estimate has
stronger correlations with all rent values than the “flow positive”
estimates. Both the flow and rent estimates are therefore
comparable and interchangeable measures of landholders’
opportunity costs at the study site.
Opportunity cost heterogeneity
To understand the factors determining the spatial distribution of
high and low opportunity costs, flow net returns were assessed
per landholder and land use. Significant correlations were found
between landholder net returns ha-1 (n = 59) and number of plots
used (p = 0.412, p < 0.001), and number of land uses (p = 0.459,
p < 0.001). There was also a significant difference in opportunity
costs between landholders without coffee (median = 0.00, n = 36)
and with coffee (median = 23,718.48, n = 23; U = 223, z = -2.97,
p < 0.001, r = -0.39). Thus, high opportunity cost landholders
were more likely to grow coffee, use more plots of land, and have
more land uses.  
The land-use regression models for coffee ((df = 6, n = 101) =
65.19, p < 0.001) explained between 48%-74% of the variance and
correctly classified 92% of cases; crops ((df = 6, n = 101) = 37.01,
p = 0.00) explained 31%-42% of the variance and correctly
classified 75% of cases; and cattle ((df = 6, n = 101) = 15.31, p =
0.02) explained 14%-19% of the variance and correctly classified
67% of cases, were all statistically significant (Table 5). Four
variables predicted the presence of coffee, particularly elevation
and access; four variables predicted the presence of crops,
particularly time to water; and two variables predicted the
presence of cattle, particularly accessibility.  
The land-use variables best predict the presence of coffee, followed
by crops, and, to a lesser extent, cattle. There is a greater
probability of finding coffee at lower elevations, in areas without
access throughout the year, farther from the road, and closer to
water. The presence of crops was more likely farther from water,
at higher elevations, closer to the road, and on flat to medium
sloped land. Cattle are more widespread throughout the study
site, at different elevations, and on varied terrain, because they
require less land specifications and because of the extensive
availability of water.
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Table 4. Correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between would rent, would sell, actual purchase price, flow, flow positive, and flow positive-no
coffee estimates. *** α = 0.01, ** α = 0.05.
 
Spearman’s Would rent Would sell Actual purchase
price
Flow Flow positive Flow positive-no
coffee
Would rent ρ 1.00 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.03 0.36*** 0.39***
N 86 86 67 82 64 61
Would sell ρ 1.00 0.47*** 0.07 0.39*** 0.43***
N 146 106 139 104 84
Actual purchase price ρ 1.00 -0.03 0.24** 0.28**
N 122 116 85 68
Flow ρ 1.00 1.00*** 1.00***
N 186 139 113
Flow positive ρ 1.00 1.00***
N 139 113
Table 5. Binary logistic regression predicting the likelihood of
growing coffee, crops, and cattle rearing. Note: slope 0 = flat, 1 =
medium, and 2 = steep; *** α = 0.01, ** α = 0.05, and * α = 0.10.
 
Variable β SE Wald Odds
ratios
Elevation:
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
-0.01***
0.00*
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
6.88
3.24
0.29
0.99
1.00
1.00
Time to road:
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
0.02*
-0.01*
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
2.99
2.89
0.41
1.02
0.99
1.00
Access (1):
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
-3.15***
0.64
1.40**
1.03
0.72
0.62
9.33
0.80
5.16
0.04
1.90
4.07
Slope (0):
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
0.22
2.84
1.49
Slope (1):
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
20.51
-0.41
-0.70
6,952.08
0.61
0.58
0.00
0.45
1.49
0.00
0.66
0.50
Slope (2):
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
20.97
-1.59*
-0.54
6,952.08
0.95
0.74
0.00
2.81
0.53
0.00
0.21
0.58
Time to water:
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
-0.32**
0.09***
-0.06**
0.16
0.03
0.03
4.02
8.99
5.09
0.73
1.10
0.94
Constant:
Coffee
Crops
Cattle
0.89
-4.97**
-1.99
6,952.09
2.56
2.32
0.00
3.76
0.74
2.45
0.02
0.14
DISCUSSION
There is still much debate about the different approaches to
opportunity cost estimation and their robustness (Corbera et al.
2007b, Wünscher 2008), as well as considerable challenges to
identifying a reliable, accurate, and cost-effective method for
determining opportunity costs of conservation (Wünscher et al.,
2011). We estimated opportunity costs for water provision using
the flow approach and the rent approach in a multiland-use
farming system. We found that the two methods offered broadly
comparable and consistent opportunity cost values although each
had strengths and weaknesses that need to inform their use.  
Quantifying and understanding the heterogeneity of opportunity
costs is an essential first step in developing a cost effective PES
scheme (Tallis and Polasky 2009, Adams et al. 2010, Badola et al.
2010). In this research, the different landholder, land, and land-
use characteristics clearly determined the spatial distribution of
opportunity costs. We discuss how our results demonstrate that
discriminating payments across a range of heterogeneous factors
is key to PES scheme design.
Opportunity cost estimation
We estimated opportunity costs as a means of assessing the cost
of improving drinking-water quality by taking land out of
production. The mean flow net returns for all land uses at the
catchment is US$1410 ha-1 and the median is US$145 ha-1. The
mean estimate is high, at the upper margin of results of other
studies. For instance, Fisher et al. (2011b) found a mean of
US$1188 from government census data for Tanzanian agriculture.
Naidoo and Adamowicz (2006) reported net benefits of US$770
for smallholder agriculture and US$1124 for cattle ranching at
the Mbaracayu Biosphere Reserve in Paraguay based on
secondary sources. The median flow estimate represents a more
stable and long-term figure for the study site. This estimate is also
in line with the opportunity costs (ranging between US$39 and
US$509) reported for similar land-use types (Cacho et al. 2005,
Chomitz et al. 2005, Börner and Wunder 2008, Wünscher et al.
2008, Bottcher et al. 2009).  
Regarding individual land uses, the mean opportunity cost of
US$5710 for coffee is high but within the range of previous studies
(US$2247-US$12,750 ha-1) of other high-value crops, such as oil,
palm, and soybean (Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006, Bottcher et
al. 2009, Börner et al. 2010, Fisher et al. 2011a). Coffee is the main
local and national agro-export (IHCAFE 2012) and at the time
of the study was being bought at the highest price for a decade
(Nasdaq 2014). Vegetable crops can yield high net returns as well,
but are riskier because of high transaction costs associated with
market variability, access, and substantial upfront investments
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(Blandon et al. 2009, Hellin et al. 2009). On the other hand, cattle
ranching and forest product collection, which are primarily
undertaken for subsistence or for local markets at the study site,
yield substantially lower net returns.  
Temporal and spatial market feedbacks affect the distribution of
farmer returns (Wells 1992, Chan et al. 2007, Tallis and Polasky
2009). In the study year, coffee prices were high but prices were
low for cattle and crops. Because these values change over time,
availability of data on these long-term feedbacks and spatial
heterogeneity should be considered in future research.
Nonetheless, the substantial difference between overall and
individual land-use opportunity costs confirms the need to
consider each land use and its associated land and landholder
characteristics separately to understand spatial and social
heterogeneity (Adams et al. 2010).
The flow and rent opportunity cost approaches
We applied the flow and rent approaches to understand their
accuracy and reliability. The flow approach is the most widely
used approach because it provides detailed information on local
heterogeneity of farmers’ net returns. However, it requires several
assumptions (e.g., value of labor), costly and time-consuming
data collection, accounting for short-term variability of returns,
and knowledge of the local context. The rent approach is
considered less reliable and dependent on the existence of a
market for land (Grieg-Gran 2008). However, the rent approach
is cost-effective, can be based on self-reported land values, and
only requires adjustment of land values to the study year.  
Despite the difference in data requirements, both approaches
provided broadly comparable and consistent estimates. The flow
approach is appropriate when detailed information on the
heterogeneity of opportunity costs is a key factor for designing
conservation strategies. This is particularly the case for watershed
services: understanding the distribution of costs and benefits
throughout the catchment (not just upstream-downstream) is
important for determining viable payment schemes. Although the
rent approach does not provide heterogeneity information, it does
help deal with the volatility of the flow estimates, it provides unit
area values, it is useful when resources are limited, and for
triangulating the results obtained by more complex approaches.
Opportunity cost heterogeneity: implications for payment for
ecosystem services (PES) scheme contracting
To design efficient PES schemes, we need to understand the
enablers and challenges for providers to enter into potential
contracts (Michael 2003, Knight et al. 2011, Raymond and Brown
2011). Efficient schemes ensure that compensation for upstream
landholders is at least equal to the opportunity costs of their land
use. However, it is important to acknowledge that in some cases
landholders will accept less than their full opportunity costs for
reasons such as to bring themselves into compliance with social
codes for land use, to secure land tenure, or because of the high
levels of competition in supply (Kosoy and Corbera 2010,
Muradian et al. 2010). The payment must also remain smaller
than the economic value of any environmental externalities
(Kosoy et al. 2007). However, exactly how compensation should
be distributed among providers is a fundamental challenge for
PES scheme design, particularly at the research site because
AESMO and the German corporation GIZ have been studying
the possibility of developing a water PES scheme at the site.  
Each upstream hectare cannot be assumed to have the same
opportunity cost and capacity to provide ecosystem services
because of their differing location in relation to water sources,
land use, and landholder and land characteristics. Scheme
payments can be based on the most profitable land use, or they
can be discriminately aligned to each land use (Pirard 2008). In
our case, using the highest opportunity cost at the study site would
make payments prohibitively expensive. For instance, average
opportunity costs for 1 ha of coffee are equivalent to 4 ha of crops
or 20 ha of cattle ranching. Thus, discriminate payments are a
better option, and they have been found to be substantially more
cost-effective and equitable, allowing for the conservation of more
land and spreading resources across a greater number of providers
(Börner et al. 2010). However, even the discrimination approach
can be financially and practically unfeasible when high
opportunity costs are present.  
Balmford and Whitten (2003) highlight the importance of
understanding how much land can be removed from production
while still allowing maintenance and growth of income. Although
water quality testing was not carried out, the land-use survey
showed that each land use has a different environmental impact
(another heterogeneity factor). Forest product collection has a
negligible impact on water quality and low economic value. Coffee
and vegetables cover a small proportion of land (less than 10%)
and are of high economic value. Vegetables are the only intensively
managed crop, which receives high agrochemical applications,
making it the highest environmental impact land use compounded
by its location at high altitudes. Coffee receives a lower amount
of agrochemicals so it has a lesser environmental impact
compared to vegetable crops. Cattle ranching is extensive on often
steep slopes, but without the need for planting improved grass, so
it is likely to be the second land use that most affects water quality
because of direct access to streams/rivers (e.g., Conroy et al. 2016).
Thus, conservation for water quality should target vegetable crops
in the core zone and cattle ranching and already forested areas
throughout the catchment. However, it is important to note that
cattle ranching is a subsistence and commercial activity, so its
inclusion in a PES scheme would need to consider its effect on
local livelihood strategies (Plumb et al. 2012).  
The small but profitable coffee plots tend to be located in remote
and inaccessible areas and at lower elevations than other land
uses. In contrast, Wünscher et al. (2011) suggested that crops with
all year accessibility, with good road conditions, and low
transportation costs have higher returns. Studies that use factors
such as accessibility as a proxy for land value, and therefore
opportunity costs, suggest the same relationship (e.g., Jacoby
2000, Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006, Börner and Wunder 2008).
These arguments are likely to be true within one land use but are
less applicable for differences in land values across multiple land
uses. In any case, coffee is the highest value crop typically grown
in remote areas of the buffer zone of the reserve, which would be
hard to monitor in a PES scheme. All this suggests that coffee is
best managed in a different way from other land uses, such as
shade coffee, and still provide ecosystem services. If  coffee were
excluded from contracting, total opportunity costs would fall to
less than a fourth of the initial estimate. So ideally PES schemes
would be better aimed at high environmental impact land uses of
low to mid returns, with payments providing sufficient incentive
for changing or discontinuing them.  
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Water services are considered to provide directional benefits, from
upstream providers to downstream beneficiaries (Fisher et al.
2009). However, most providers of the service reside throughout
the catchment (not necessarily at their plots) making them also
beneficiaries of the service; this has rarely been mentioned in the
literature. This duality of roles is potentially important for
contracting in PES schemes, requiring further research, because
it can influence providers’ willingness to enter into contracts.
Identifying and targeting landholders with dual roles could be a
good starting point for a PES scheme. Such targeting could save
time, help personalize environmental awareness efforts, and, if
managed appropriately, could be crucial to secure the acceptance
of the scheme. The challenges of securing unused land and the
dual role of most landholders emphasize the need for a scheme
that completely sets land aside because of the challenges of
regulating and monitoring land (non) use.  
As long as there is substantial heterogeneity in opportunity costs
of supplying ecosystem services, hidden information between
buyers and suppliers of services will be a problem. Society will
benefit more if  scheme payments only compensate landowners’
opportunity costs, and no more. There are several methods that
target or discriminate PES scheme contracts, such as spatial
targeting (Wendland et al. 2010, Wònscher et al. 2008), cost-
effective targeting based on a cost-benefit ratio (Chen et al. 2010),
targeting specific groups such as the poor (Gauvin et al. 2010,
Kaczan et al. 2013), conservation targets (Schroter et al. 2014),
and the more recent procurement PES auctions (Ferraro 2008).
These options could all be used at the research site to account for
opportunity cost heterogeneity and guide scheme design.
CONCLUSIONS
Determining landholders’ opportunity costs is key to defining fair
and targeted payments in schemes, such as PES, when financial
resources are often limited. However, estimating opportunity
costs is complex, and there is still much debate about the different
estimation methods, their robustness, and the factors explaining
their distribution. We compared the flow and rent approaches to
opportunity cost estimation and found them to be broadly
comparable and consistent. The flow approach helps to
understand the heterogeneity of opportunity costs, which is
needed to inform payment distribution and the design of a viable
PES scheme. The rent approach helps deal with the volatility of
the flow estimates, provides unit area values, and is useful when
resources are limited.  
We found that in settings characterized by complex land-use
patterns and heterogeneous opportunity costs, uniform payments
will likely result in low participation hence discriminate payments
are required. In our case, this means discriminating payments to
providers in terms of a range of factors is key to PES scheme
design. These factors include the spatial heterogeneity between
upstream and downstream plots, core and buffer zones, and
distance of land from water sources, as well as how opportunity
costs vary depending on land-use differences (e.g., environmental
impact) and landholder characteristics (e.g., dual landholders that
are both provider and beneficiary). The results indicate that
targeting dual landholders with low opportunity costs and high
impacts, as well as ensuring the protection of unused land through
specific governance structures, are key to a viable scheme in the
research site.
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Appendix 1. Socioeconomic and farmer characteristics for opportunity cost survey 
respondents (n = 62). Note: 
1
forest use is not included here; 
2
one observation was removed as 
the respondent had a university degree in agronomy. 
Variable 
Mean/ 
Proportion 
SE SD Range 
Age 56 1.62 12.76 27 - 89 
Female 0.11 0.04 0.32  
Years living in area 54.44 1.79 14.13 25 -89 
Years of education 4.23 0.63 4.93 0 – 18 
Family size 5.35 0.35 2.74 1 – 12 
Productive land uses per farmer
1 
1.45 0.12 0.95 0 - 4 
Days of agronomic training received
2
 34.73 12.04 94.79 0 – 481 
Household income sources 2.53 0.22 1.71 0 – 7 
Income contributed by landholder 74.80 4.34 34.21 0 – 100 
Years owning land plots 17.78 1.44 11.32 0.5 – 50 
Plots per farmer 1.13 0.07 0.58 1 - 4 
 
 
